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I. INTRODUCTION
The Washington litigation process places a premium on the
skillful management of expert witnesses.' Testimony presented
by such witnesses is both readily admissible2 and virtually unlim-
ited in scope. 3 Washington's adoption of the new Rules of Evi-
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1. The same can be said of civil litigation within the federal system or any other
jurisdiction that has adopted procedural and evidentiary rules based upon the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence.
2. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Washington have encouraged the use of
expert testimony. The court has limited itself to the statement that the trial court has
broad discretion to determine whether expert testimony should be admitted. State v.
Tatum, 58 Wash. 2d 73, 360 P.2d 754 (1961). A trial court will not be reversed unless it
has abused that discretion in ruling upon the competency of a purported expert or in
admitting expert testimony where an issue is one of "common knowledge." Ball v. Smith,
87 Wash. 2d 717, 556 P.2d 936 (1976); Poston v. Clinton, 66 Wash. 2d 911, 406 P.2d 623
(1965). In reality, a Washington trial court will virtually never be reversed for admitting
expert testimony. Only where an expert is grossly and patently incompetent will the trial
court refuse to admit his testimony. In Nelson Equip. Co. v. Estep, 50 Wash. 2d 612, 313
P.2d 679 (1957), the court affirmed a trial court decision to allow expert testimony where
the witness admitted that he was not an "expert."
Objections to a witness's qualifications relate solely to the weight of his testimony.
Nordstrom v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Co., 75 Wash. 2d 629, 453 P.2d 619 (1969);
Nelson Equip. Co. v. Estep, 50 Wash. 2d 612, 313 P.2d 679 (1957). In practice, the issue
of competency has become a matter for the trier of fact. The concepts of "competency"
and "credibility" have become closely intertwined.
The reluctance of trial courts to reject purported expert testimony is understandable.
As the supreme court's decision in Bernal v. American Honda Motor Co., 87 Wash. 2d
406, 553 P.2d 107 (1976), would suggest, a trial court is far more likely to be reversed for
rejecting such testimony than for admitting it. The Bernal case involved a products
liability claim for enhanced injuries resulting from a rear end vehicular accident. The
supreme court reversed a summary judgment of dismissal and held, inter alia, that the
trial court erred in not considering an affidavit filed by a City of Auburn police officer.
The affiant's experience was limited to three and one-half years in the police department's
traffic division. The supreme court, nevertheless, held that the officer "could reasonably"
have been found competent to testify as to both biomechanical and automotive design
issues. Id. at 412-13, 553 P.2d at 111.
3. Expert witnesses can express opinions on the ultimate facts to be determined by
the trier of fact. WASH. R. EVID. 704. Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 91 Wash. 2d
345, 588 P.2d 1346 (1979); Battlen v. South Seattle Water Co., 65 Wash. 2d 547, 398 P.2d
719 (1965). The only qualification to that premise is that such an opinion must not be
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dence4 can only serve to reinforce the current practice. 5 Since
most litigated cases involve substantial factual disputes, the de-
velopment and presentation of expert testimony should be a
major concern of all trial attorneys.'
The importance of trial examination has never been under-
rated. That part of the litigation process is one that all attorneys
relish. The skillful management of expert witnesses, however,
involves far more than the formulation of techniques for trial
examination. The proper selection, preparation, and protection of
one's own experts lay the necessary groundwork for direct exami-
nation. Timely ascertainment and thorough cross-examination of
opposing experts during the discovery process allow an attorney
to limit their effectiveness at trial. Unfortunately, these prelimi-
nary matters are often mismanaged. As a result, many attorneys
begin trial with little chance of making a skillful presentation.
This article offers a basic system for the management and
trial use of expert witnesses.7 Central to this system is a concern
for the preliminary litigation events that are so often overlooked.
one likely to "mislead" the trier of fact. Gerard v. Peasley, 66 Wash. 2d 449, 403 P.2d 45
(1965).
4. The Washington Rules of Evidence became effective on April 2, 1979. Although
there are some significant differences, the Washington rules are substantially the same
as the Federal Rules of Evidence.
5. A detailed comparison of the new Rules of Evidence and prior Washington deci-
sional law on this subject is beyond the scope of this article. It can be noted, however,
that Article 7, which deals with expert testimony, is not dramatically different from the
prior decisional law. The Rules of Evidence will serve to make existing practice more
uniform. There are, for instance, Washington cases that reject expert testimony based
solely on hearsay. See Mercer v. Department of Labor & Indus., 74 Wash. 2d 96, 442 P.2d
1000 (1968); Pierce County ex rel. Bellingham v. Duffy, 104 Wash. 426, 176 P. 670 (1918).
State v. Weinberg, 74 Wash. 2d 372, 444 P.2d 787 (1968), and other recent decisions allow
testimony as to opinions based on hearsay and other inadmissible facts. The contrary line
of authority, however, had never been formally overruled. Rule 703, which expressly allows
an expert to make reference to facts and data that are not themselves admissible in
evidence, eliminates any confusion on this issue. WASH. R. Evm. 703.
6. Rule 702 is consistent with prior decisional law:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
WASH. R. EvID. 702. See Gerberg v. Crosby, 52 Wash. 2d 792, 329 P.2d 184 (1958).
7. While certain basic rules must be mastered, every attorney will feel more comforta-
ble using his own techniques. It is important, however, to develop a system for the man-
agement of expert witnesses. Basic to that system is an overview of the manner in which
the various parts of the litigation process fit together.
Expert Witnesses
II. SELECTING EXPERTS
A. Appropriateness
Rule 702 of the new Rules of Evidence gives the trial court'
much discretion in determining whether expert testimony is ap-
propriate.' The thrust of that rule, however, is that expert testi-
mony should be allowed in all cases where such testimony "will
assist" the trier of fact. 0 Since trial judges in Washington cannot
comment upon or resolve evidentiary disputes," the language in
the Rule should be applied liberally in favor of admissibility. In
practice, a judge will admit expert testimony as long as it "may"
assist the trier of fact.
B. Deciding Whom To Select
In most litigated cases, opposing counsel will also produce
expert testimony on the same issues. As a result, the selection
process involves more than securing an expert who will render a
favorable opinion. The credibility and persuasiveness of an expert
are equally important concerns. The ultimate decision made by
the trier of fact will often turn on his feeling as to which expert is
better qualified and more trustworthy.
Experts who testify in many different substantive areas
should be avoided. That these experts of "last resort" are often
used is understandable. They are highly visible, adept at testify-
ing, and always available. These experts, however, are not highly
credible and should remain experts of last resort. Specialists and
sub-specialists are far more credible. 2 Unfortunately, the secur-
8. The article touches only lightly upon trial examination. This area is one that is
both highly personal and one in which innate skill plays a large part. The preliminary
management of expert witnesses is a function that all thorough lawyers should be able to
perform skillfully.
9. See note 6 supra.
10. Some older decisions, while following the literal language of the Gerberg stan-
dard, have applied it in a restrictive manner. See Wilkinson v. Martin, 56 Wash. 2d 921,
340 P.2d 608 (1960); Ewer v. Johnson, 44 Wash. 2d 746, 270 P.2d 813 (1954). Those
decisions, emphasizing that an issue was a matter of "common knowledge," affirmed the
exclusion of expert testimony. The supreme court may apply the "common knowledge"
qualification to the standard set out in Rule 702. That qualification is simply a prelimi-
nary inquiry in determining whether evidence "will assist" the trier of fact. In any case,
that qualification is not expressly set out in the new Rule with which trial judges and
attorneys will grapple.
11. Article IV, section 16 of the Washington Constitution prohibits trial judges from
commenting on factual matters. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 16. See also Risley v. Moberg,
69 Wash. 2d 560, 419 P.2d 151 (1966).
12. Universities are prime locations for such experts. Major universities such as the
1979]
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ing of highly qualified experts is not a mechanical process.' 3
In many cases, independent observers can be qualified as
expert witnesses. As Rule 702 emphasizes, an expert witness need
not possess any academic credentials.' 4 Law enforcement officers,
for example, can be used very effectively as expert witnesses. A
thorough police officer, testifying as to point of impact, speed, or
the rules of the road, will probably be more persuasive than ex-
perts retained by either of the parties." The fact that an expert
has not been retained by any of the parties can only add to his
credibility. 6
In many cases, service of the summons and complaint is the
first notice that a defendant has of a particular claim. As a result,
the plaintiff has the first opportunity to retain the most qualified
experts available on the issues involved in that lawsuit.
III. PREPARATION OF ONE'S OWN EXPERTS AND THE PRETRIAL
PROCESS
A. Communications Between Attorney and Expert
Washington Superior Court Civil Rule 26(b)(3) protects the
confidentiality of both an attorney's work product and the mental
impressions of an attorney or other "representative" of a party.'"
That rule, however, does not discuss an attorney's attempt to
University of Washington are staffed with excellent physicians and other professors in all
of the physical and social sciences. These witnesses invariably have outstanding creden-
tials.
13. Attorneys should not limit their search to their own cities or even to Washington
state.
14. Rule 702 provides that a person may render an expert opinion as long as he is an
expert "by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education . WASH. R. EvID. 702
(emphasis added).
15. Attorneys should be creative in finding issues about which expert testimony can
be elicited from a particular witness. See Bernal v. American Honda Motor Co., 87 Wash.
2d 406, 553 P.2d 107 (1976).
16. The trial court is itself empowered by Rule 706 to appoint and elicit testimony
from expert witnesses. In fact, Rule 706(c) allows the court in the exercise of its discretion
to inform the jury that it, and not one of the parties, appointed that expert. WAsH. R.
EvID. 706(c). Obviously, such an announcement would greatly heighten that expert's
credibility. Because of the constitutional prohibition against commenting on the evidence,
it remains to be seen how often that discretionary power will be invoked. See note 11
supra.
17. An attorney's or representative's work product may be discoverable only if oppos-
ing counsel can make a showing that he is "unable without undue hardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." WAsH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R.
26(b)(3) [hereinafter cited as CR]. See Crenna v. Ford Motor Co., 12 Wash. App. 824,
532 P.2d 290, pet. rev. denied, 85 Wash. 2d 1011 (1975).'
1979] Expert Witnesses 163
influence his own expert's thought process. Opposing counsel is
entitled to know the nature of a trial expert's assignment and all
the things he has considered in reaching his opinions. Although
opposing counsel will normally not object to a segregation of
attorney-expert correspondence prior to the expert's deposition,
he need not necessarily make such a concession. 8 Consequently,
an attorney should never memorialize his own views in materials
sent to an expert.
Only those materials which opposing counsel and the finder
of fact can safely review should be provided to an expert. Provid-
ing the trial expert with all relevant materials, including adverse
evidence, will impress the trier of fact that the expert has per-
formed a thorough evaluation. Ordinarily, such materials should
be limited to those that either will be admissible in evidence at
the time of trial or will be the proper basis for the expert's opin-
ions.'
18. It is unclear whether opposing counsel has a right to review correspondence and
other materials provided to a trial expert by the attorney who retained him. To allow such
discovery would substantially lessen the confidentiality of the attorney-expert relation-
ship. Some federal courts, however, have emphasized that opposing counsel is entitled to
discover the bases for an expert's opinions. Franks v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 41
F.R.D. 234 (W.D. Tex. 1966). In United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D.
Md. 1963), the court recognized the opposing counsel's right to ascertain the factual
information furnished to an expert. In a related matter, the court in Quadrini v. Sikorsky
Aircraft Div., United Aircraft Corp., 74 F.R.D. 594 (D. Conn. 1977), allowed discovery of
reports embodying preliminary conclusions, after expressing concern about the possibility
of a "sanitized presentation at trial." Id. at 595. In Seven-Up Co. v. Get Up Corp., 30
F.R.D. 550 (N.D. Ohio 1962), the court allowed opposing counsel to discover information
provided to lay witnesses where it appeared that such information might influence their
testimony. As the court recognized:
Under such circumstances, it is apparent that the manner of selection of the
prospective witnesses or interviewees and the facts and circumstances surround-
ing the initial approach to such persons are facts which, in themselves, are
relevant and material in determining whether any coercion or suggestion, how-
ever subtle or unintentional, on the part of the interviewer, may have influenced
the witnesses' responses ...
The material to be produced or disclosed is not considered to be the work
product of a lawyer, described in Hickman v. Taylor . ...
Id. at 552-53 (emphasis added; citation omitted). While Seven-Up predates the 1970
amendment to Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a reading of both
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), and the amendment shows that the amendment
was essentially a codification of the Hickman rule.
19. Rule 703 allows an expert to refer to matters even though they may not be
admissible in evidence. WASH. R. Evm. 703. The materials which will normally be pro-
vided to an expert include deposition transcripts of lay witnesses, real evidence, and those
interrogatory answers that relate to his assignment. Reviewing those materials will also
allow an expert to make certain that his opinions are consistent with the lay testimony
that will be presented at trial. In many cases, it is beneficial to have defense experts review
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One should be careful about having experts perform experi-
ments or tests. Opposing counsel is entitled to know about such
work. If the results of that work do not support the proponent's
position, it will be necessary to refrain from calling that witness. 0
As a general rule, a party's experts should be isolated from
one another during the discovery process. In fact, experts should
be instructed that they are not to communicate with each other
or to furnish each other with any reports or other material. An
attorney should control the materials his expert accumulates.
Such a procedure serves three practical purposes. First, it pro-
tects against the furnishing of inappropriate or biased comments
from one expert to another. Second, an attorney may wish to
refrain from using one of the expert witnesses that he has re-
tained. If that expert's report has been furnished to other experts,
opposing counsel will be able to cross-examine those trial experts
on the basis of the report. Third, keeping experts isolated empha-
sizes their independence and strengthens their credibility.
Where the opinions of one expert constitute the foundation
for another expert's opinions, those experts must necessarily be
familiar with each other's work. In such a situation, an attorney
should still act as the intermediary between his experts in order
to control the materials that they exchange. Materials developed
by one expert should never be transmitted to another expert un-
less counsel has determined either that the expert preparing the
report will be called as a trial witness or that there is nothing
harmful in those particular reports.
the depositions given by plaintiff's experts before they themselves perform any substan-
tive work. Such a practice does not result in any loss of credibility since the defense
posture is a responsive one. The credibility of plaintiff's experts is enhanced if at least
his opinions have been formed prior to a review of the defense expert's testimony. All
experts, of course, should be familiar with the testimony of opposition experts before
giving their trial testimony.
20. If an attorney does refrain from calling such an expert at trial, he can usually
prevent opposing counsel from learning about the adverse test or experiment. CR
26(b)(4)(B). See Crenna v. Ford Motor Co., 12 Wash. App. 824, 532 P.2d 290, pet. rev.
denied, 85 Wash. 2d 1011 (1975). If a particular expert is critical to a party's case, counsel
should consider retaining an additional expert to perform the desired experiment or test.
While this strategy is not consistent with the "search for truth," it does not violate Ethical
Consideration 7-27 or any other ethical consideration set out in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. WASH. ST. BAR Ass'N CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY. As the court
of appeals indicated in Crenna, work performed by "consulting experts" need not be
divulged. 12 Wash. App. at 832, 532 P.2d at 295. An attorney, moreover, is free to define
or limit a potential trial expert's assignment in any way he sees fit. Ethical Consideration
7-1 instructs an attorney to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law.
WASH. ST. BAR Ass'N CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REPONSIBILITY Canon 7. In protecting a
primary trial expert in such a fashion, an attorney is doing exactly that.
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Careful consideration should also be given to the matter of.
whether an expert should prepare a written report. In most cases
such a report should not be written." A report unnecessarily com-
mits an expert witness to a particular position and to the factual
data upon which he has relied. As the discovery process unfolds,
new facts may be discovered. 2 An expert witness, moreover, may
not fully understand all the legal implications of the statements
contained in his report.
B. The Deposition of One's Own Expert
1. Procedure and Timing
In most cases, parties willingly allow the deposition of those
expert witnesses who will testify at trial. 3  Civil Rule
21. A physician performing an independent medical examination pursuant to Civil
Rule 35 must prepare such a report. CR 35(b)(1). There are other instances in which it
may be desirable to have an expert prepare a report. Showing an opponent the full extent
of one's case may promote settlement. It may also be necessary to have a report prepared
in order to apprise an unyielding client of the full extent of the problems facing him. When
such a report will be prepared, counsel should meet with the expert witness before the
report is prepared.
22. It should also be noted that even where the factual data is available, expert
witnesses, like attorneys, are never as fully prepared during the discovery process as they
are immediately prior to trial.
23. Discovery of expert witnesses is generally controlled by Civil Rule 26, which
provides:
Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable
under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed
in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows:. (A) (i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to
identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness
at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify,
and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is
expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. (ii) Upon
motion, the court may order further discovery by other means, subject to such
restrictions as to scope and such provisions, pursuant to subdivision (b)(4)(C)
of this rule, concerning fees and expenses as the court may deem appropriate.
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who
has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of
litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a
witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional
circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery
to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, (i) the court shall require that
the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in
responding to discovery under subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this
rule; and (ii) with respect to discovery obtained under subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii)
of this rule the court may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under
subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the court shall require, the party seeking dis-
covery to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably
166 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 3:159
26(b)(4) (A) (ii), however, does not require such willingness. With-
out leave of court or the acquiescence of opposing counsel, an
expert may not be deposed. Under Civil Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i), in-
terrogatories are the only discovery device to which a party is
clearly entitled .24
The recent trend in the federal courts, however, is to allow
wide-ranging depositions to be taken.25 Rule of Evidence 705,
based on the federal counterpart, would seem to require such an
approach. Under that rule an expert can testify to an opinion
without disclosing the factual basis for that opinion.26 Within
such a system, effective cross-examination at trial is not possible
without full pretrial disclosure. The use of interrogatories, more-
over, is seldom an adequate means of discovery with respect to
expert witnesses.
incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.
CR 26(b)(4).
24. Very few Washington cases deal with this particular matter. In one such case,
Meeks v. Marx, 15 Wash. App. 571, 550 P.2d 1158 (1976), the court of appeals did
recognize that a trial court could limit the scope of examination of an opposing expert.
25. The Washington Supreme Court has indicated that it will be guided by federal
decisions construing identical Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wood v. Morris, 87 Wash.
2d 501, 511, 554 P.2d 1032, 1038 (1976); Harding v. Will, 81 Wash. 2d 132, 135 n.2, 500
P.2d 91, 95 n.2 (1972). The federal courts have routinely addressed this issue. In Grinnell
Corp. v. Hackett, 70 F.R.D. 326 (D.R.I. 1976), the court held that the purpose of the
federal discovery rules was to provide for the fullest possible discovery of all issues and
facts involved in the litigation. The only basis for restricting discovery of information held
by experts rests in the doctrine of "fairness." See Pearl Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz
Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Herbst v. International Tel. & Tel.
Corp., 65 F.R.D. 528 (D. Conn. 1975). Where depositions were not permitted, the courts
often based their decisions on counsel's failure to have first elicited the expert's opinions
through interrogatories. United States v. IBM, 72 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); United
States v. John R.-Piquette, 52 F.R.D. 370, 372 (E.D. Mich. 1971). See also 65 F.R.D. 528;
Rupp v. Vock & Weiderhold, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 111 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
In some cases the federal courts have imposed restrictions on the scope of exami-
nation. See, e.g., Pearl Brewing, 415 F. Supp. at 1138-41; Maginnis v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 207 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. La. 1962) (court allowed examination as to facts
known by the expert but refused to allow discovery as to his opinions and conclusions);
Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954). The current trend, however,
is to reject the Maginnis distinction. United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968).
The language of Washington Evidence Rule 102, with its emphasis on truth and justice,
seemingly directs Washington courts to promote this trend: "These rules shall be con-
strued . . . to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly deter-
mined." WASH. R. EvID. 102.
26. Rule 705 provides:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons
therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the judge
requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
WASH. R. EvID. 705.
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The timing of depositions is important. Ordinarily, a defen-
dant should demand the right to depose plaintiff's expert before
he allows his own expert to be deposed.Y Defense counsel should
argue that his expert will be responding to the plaintiff's conten-
tions and that he has no need for expert testimony unless and
until the plaintiff has presented a prima facie case.28 For his part
the plaintiff might try to force the defendant's expert witness to
commit himself before the plaintiff's expert is deposed.29
Unless there are exceptional circumstances, a party cannot
discover facts or opinions held by opposing experts who will not
be called as witnesses at trial by the party retaining them .3 0 This
general rule and the provisions of Civil Rule 26(b)(4)(B) are rele-
vant to the following four important situations.
Treating Physicians. Civil Rule 35(b)(2) provides that once
a plaintiff either requests a copy of an independent examiner's
report or takes that doctor's deposition, he waives the physician-
patient privilege as to any past or future treating physicians .3
Even if the plaintiff does not so act, he necessarily waives his
27. The federal courts have emphasized that they will not allow one party to unfairly
use another party's experts to prepare his own case. Pearl Brewing Co. v. Jos. SchlitzBrewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 70 F.R.D.326 (D.R.I. 1976). See note 24 supra. Since the plaintiff has the burden of going forward
at the time of the trial, plaintiff should offer his expert first.
28. There are, however, disadvanthges associated with initiating the deposition pro-cess. For example, although plaintiff's expert has already been deposed, he may neverthe-less substantially modify or expand upon his views after reading the subsequent testimonyof the defense expert. While his prior testimony may successfully serve to impeach suchan expert, defense counsel may be unaware of material changes in his testimony until theexpert has already testified at trial. If a party has the opportunity to conduct a seconddeposition for each expert, this problem can be minimized. If such an opportunity doesnot exist, counsel should seek to protect himself by serving interrogatories directed to
testimonial changes.
29, In Rupp v. Vock & Weiderhold, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 111 (N.D. Ohio 1971), the courtrecognized that it might not allow a defendant to depose a plaintiff's expert until thedefendant had prepared detailed answers to federal civil rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) interrogatories
directed to the defense expert.
30. CR 26(b)(4)(B). See note 23 supra.
31. Civil Rule 35(a) states:
When the mental or physical condition (including the blood group) of a party,
or of a person in the custody or under the legal control of a party is in contro-versy, the court in which the action is pending may order the party to submit
to a physical or mental examination by a physician or to produce for examina-tion the person in his custody or legal control. The order may be made only on
motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and
to all parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scopeof the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made.
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physician-patient privilege during any personal injury action.32 A
question still remains as to exactly when he waives that privi-
lege .3
Physicians Retained by Defendant. Civil Rule 26(b)(4)(B)
specifically provides that its protection does not apply to physi-
cians conducting independent medical examinations at the re-
quest of a defendant .3 The plaintiff, moreover, has an absolute
right to call as a witness any physician retained by the defendant
to examine the injured plaintiff.35 Care must be exercised in de-
ciding whether or not to have an independent medical examina-
tion performed. The independent physician may simply give
credence to the contentions set out by the plaintiff's treating
doctors. Indeed, it is not uncommon for the independent exami-
ner to take a more serious view of the injuries than does the
plaintiff's own treating doctors.
Employees of a Party. An attorney has the right to take the
deposition of employees of a party opponent, even though those
employees may have expert opinions and even though they are
not expected to be called as witnesses by the employer.3 6 Only
32. Phipps v. Sasser, 74 Wash. 2d 439, 445 P.2d 624 (1968).
33. In Phipps, the court refused to establish a specific point in a personal injury
action at which the plaintiff is considered to have made a blanket waiver of the physician-
patient privilege. The court did recognize that the privilege is waived whenever it becomes"apparent" that the plaintiff must decide to call one of his physicians as a witness at trial.
Id. at 448, 445 P.2d at 628-29. While the court respected the need to preserve plaintiff's
right to dismiss rather than face disclosure, it also recognized that the waiver could not
be delayed until the trial. The court also stated that the defendant is entitled to know
that the privilege will be waived in time to take the depositions of the testifying physician
and any other physicians who have information relevant to the plaintiff's condition. In
State v. Tradewell, 9 Wash. App. 821, 823-24, 515 P.2d 172, 173-74, pet. rev. denied, 83
Wash. 2d 1005 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 985 (1974), the court recognized that the
plaintiff will not be allowed to pick and choose between physician witnesses with respect
to the claimed injury. The court has not specifically addressed the situation in which the
defendant wishes to gain discovery about a different physicial condition which he contends
is theocause of the plaintiff's disability. The general language in State v. Rochelle, 11
Wash. App. 887, 527 P.2d 87 (1974), however, indicates that in bringing a personal injury
action, the plaintiff waives his physician-patient privilege as to any medical testimony
which tends to contradict or impeach his medical evidence.
34. See note 23 supra. In cross-referencing to Civil Rule 35(b), Civil Rule 26(b)(4)(B)
provides both that the plaintiff can secure a copy of the report that must be prepared by
the examining physician and that he can take the deposition of that physician. CR
26(b)(4)(B).
35. The civil rules do not speak to this issue. In State ex rel. Berge v. Superior Court,
154 Wash. 144, 281 P. 335 (1929), a case decided well before the passage of the civil rules,
the supreme court recognized such a right. The passage of the rules has not abrogated that
right.
36. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397
(E.D. Va. 1975); Rodrigues v. Hrinda, 56 F.R.D. 11 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
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those in-house experts that are "retained or specially employed
in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial" are protected
under Civil Rule 26(b)(4)(B).3 7
Other Experts. Nonexamining medical consultants andnonmedical experts who are not employees of a party may not be
subjected to discovery or called as witnesses at trial unless the
party retaining that expert will himself use the expert as a trial
witness.3 8 An attorney should be certain that he wishes to call an
expert as a trial witness before serving that witness up for a depo-
sition. From that time onward the expert's function may be con-
strued to be more than that of a "consulting" witness."9
2. Preparing an Expert for His Deposition
An expert should not be produced for a deposition until he
is fully prepared and has all necessary factual material in his file.
Prior to the deposition, the expert and the attorney should review
the expert's entire file and proposed testimony. Privileged or work
product materials should be segregated into a separate folder.
The expert, however, should clearly disclose to the opposing party
that he has made such a segregation. 0
The attorney should advise the expert as to the basic tenor
that should be taken during the deposition. An expert should
know whether to impress opposing counsel with the full extent of
his knowledge or whether to answer the questions honestly, but
as narrowly as possible. Further, an attorney and his expert
should review similar cases in which the expert has been involved
and be ready to explain any inconsistencies in those cases.
37. Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 69 (D. Kan. 1975); Virginia Elec. & Power
Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Va. 1975).
The corporate employer should seek to limit this inquiry. The courts have not allowedone party to unfairly use another party's experts to prepare his own case. See notes 24-25
supra. Only those opinions held prior to a substantive event upon which the litigation
turns should be discoverable. Opinions evidencing prior knowledge or notice may not bewithheld. Opposing counsel, however, should not be allowed to use hypothetical questions
either to elicit an employee's current opinions or to have the employee formulate an asyet unformed opinion for use at trial. The opposing party should be forced to use his own
experts to build his case.
38. CR 26(b)(4)(B), construed in Crenna v. Ford Motor Co., 12 Wash. App. 824, 532P.2d 290, pet. rev. denied, 85 Wash. 2d 1011 (1975). Discovery or use at trial of such a
witness can be accomplished only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.
39. A court may hold that it would be suppressing its truth-seeking function if suchan expert's testimony might not then be presented to the jury. See WAsH. R. EvID. 102.
40. If an attorney carefully protects his expert there will not be a need for segregatingsuch materials. If sensitive attorney-expert materials do exist, the attorney should not
allow review of such materials without a court order. See CR 30(d).
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An attorney should carefully digest the transcript of his own
expert's deposition or, if the case does not merit transcription,
take careful notes during the deposition. There are several rea-
sons for preparing such a digest. First, in asking questions the
other attorney will undoubtedly indicate the direction that he
and his expert will take at the time of trial. Second, objectionable
questions asked during the deposition can be addressed in a
motion in limine.4 ' Third, difficult areas may be defused by bring-
ing them out in a more favorable manner during direct trial ex-
amination.
IV. DEALING WITH OPPOSITION EXPERTS DURING THE DIScOVERY
PROCESS
A. Ascertainment
An attorney should determine the identity of the experts
retained by opposing counsel to the full extent allowable under
Civil Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) .42 Interrogatories permitted under that
subsection should be served upon opposing counsel at the very
outset of the discovery process.43 Unfortunately, even after inter-
rogatories have been served, opposing counsel will ordinarily not
furnish the names of his experts until he is pressed." When that
occurs, a motion to compel the identification of expert witnesses
should be filed at an early stage in the litigation."
B. Preparation for the Deposition
In preparing for the deposition of the opposition's expert, an
41. Objections should be made outside the presence of the jury whenever possible.
42. See note 23 supra.
43. Opposing counsel has a duty to supplement his answers to those interrogatories
pursuant to CR 26(e)(1)(B).
44. The most common response to such interrogatories is "unknown at this time."
Often, identification of expert witnesses is not made until a few weeks prior to trial.
45. Such a motion may be delineated as a "Motion for an Order Limiting Experts."
The right to such a cut-off date is recognized impliedly in Civil Rule 26(e)(1)(B), which
states:
A party who has responded to a request for discovery with a response that was
complete when made is under no duty to supplement his response to include
information thereafter acquired, except as follows:
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with
respect to any question directly addressed to. . . (b) the identity of each person
expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on which
he is expected to testify, and the substance of his testimony.
The party making the motion should be prepared to list his own experts either at the
requested date or shortly thereafter. CR 26(e)(1)(B).
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attorney should review all prior testimony given by the expert."
The expert, moreover, should be served with a subpoena duces
tecum prior to the deposition. Unless such a subpoena is served,
the trial itself may be the first opportunity for review of the mate-
rials upon which the expert relies.'7 If inquiry about treatises or
other materials will be made, a schedule detailing such material
should be attached to the subpoena duces tecum. The opposing
expert's own file often will not contain all the materials of concern
to the interrogating attorney. By incorporating such a schedule,
an attorney can better prevent an expert from avoiding difficult
questions.
Prior to the actual taking of the deposition, a conference with
one's own expert should be conducted. That conference serves
several invaluable purposes. One's own expert can render advice
about technical terminology, prior testimony given by the opposi-
tion expert, and that expert's weaknesses. The terminology that
counsel will use during the deposition should be carefully re-
viewed. It is important that deposition terminology be under-
stood both by the expert and by in-house personnel. The termi-
nology should have a clear and unmistakable meaning both to the
opposing expert and to one's own witnesses and consultants. In
preparing expert witnesses and in pinning down the opposing
expert, this type of predeposition preparation is essential. During
such a conference it is also productive to determine which trea-
tises and articles favorable to the questioner's client will be recog-
nized as authoritative by the opposition."
46. Transcripts of experts' testimony should be kept in a central file. The client,
especially a national or international concern, may have collected an expert's testimony
in other parts of the country or world.
47. The subpoena duces tecum must be tailored to the particular case. In preparing
a subpoena the following items should be listed in most cases: (1) all materials generated
or received by the expert working on the litigation; (2) any documents logging the hours
he has spent on the case; (3) a log of any similar cases on which he has been retained;
(4) copies of articles or publications he has written in the substantive area involved in
the litigation; and (5) any treatises, books or other materials of any type that the expert
reviewed in connection with the litigation. All materials, whether or not they support his
opinions, should be produced. If such a production is cumbersome, counsel should request
that a listing of these materials be made available prior to the deposition.
48. In exploring this latter subject, it is necessary to determine the exact title and
edition of the volume about which inquiry will be made. The opposing expert may refuse
to admit that a volume is authoritative simply because it is not the most up-to-date
edition.
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C. Taking the Deposition
One's goals in taking an opposing expert's deposition should
be clearly formulated before the deposition. Unless an attorney
shows some restraint, he may teach the opposition more about his
own case than he learns from the opposing expert. The questions
asked during a deposition often expose the concerns, factual con-
tentions, and strategy of both the questioner and his experts.
Where settlement is the primary goal, an attorney may desire to
divulge certain lines of attack that might ordinarily be reserved
for trial. Generally, however, an attorney should save his most
penetrating questions for trial.
At the outset of the deposition, the questioner should make
certain to use terminology that he and his own expert have agreed
upon during their predeposition conference. The lines of inquiry
pursued during the deposition of an opposing expert will vary
from case to case. There are a few basic questions, however, that
should be directed to every expert during his deposition. It is
essential to elicit the following information during the deposition:
(1) the nature of the input, both oral and written, provided to
the expert both by opposing counsel and by other experts;
(2) a chronological, step-by-step account of all the work the
expert has performed on the particular case;
(3) a discussion of the materials he has reviewed and how those
materials have influenced his opinion; and
(4) a listing of any further work, review, experiments or tests
in which he might engage prior to the time of trial.
In a deposition, unlike trial, an attorney should give an opposing
expert a chance to expand on his answers. One's technique should
not be limited to the leading questions that will be propounded
at the time of trial. 9 This is not to minimize the importance of
circumscribing the opposing expert or having him unconsciously
adopt the characterizations and terminology set out in the ques-
tions. In strictly limiting oneself to such a technique, however,
very little is learned as to exactly how the opposing expert will
49. The third inquiry has a heightened importance under the new Rules of Evidence.
Rules 703 and 705 offer a choice of contrasting styles for presenting expert testimony. Rule
703 allows reference to innumerable authoritative sources that support the witness's opin-
ion. Rule 705 allows the expert, if he so chooses, to state his opinion without any reference
to the data upon which he relies. In either case, effective cross-examination rests upon
full discovery. Where vast supporting data will be produced, it is necessary to probe for
weaknesses in those materials prior to trial. Where direct trial testimony itself does not
disclose underlying sources, cross-examination will be treacherous unless those materials
were disclosed during the discovery process.
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present his testimony on direct examination. A careful blending
of open-ended and leading questions is advisable in the deposi-
tion examination of the opposing expert.
V. THE DIRECT EXAMINATION OF ONE'S OWN EXPERT
A. Qualification
The direct examination of an expert witness involves twoseparate processes. The first process, the qualification of an ex-pert witness, is no less important than that of eliciting his sub-stantive opinions. In fact, an expert's opinion has little meaning
if the jury is not favorably impressed with his credentials and
trustworthiness. The qualification process should be neither me-
chanical nor limited to establishing that the expert is legallycompetent to testify. One hopes an attorney has not gone to the
substantial expense of preparing an expert who might not meetthe minimal competency standards. Any attempt by opposing
counsel to admit that an expert is qualified should be resisted.As much time at possible should be spent in drawing out theeducation, experience, and professional status of the expert.
B. Eliciting the Expert's Opinions
Having established an expert's qualifications, an attorneymust then elicit the expert's opinions. The questions and answersmaking up the direct examination should be reviewed in advance.
While the examination should not sound scripted, neither the
attorney nor the expert should be surprised by the other's ap-proach.50 An attorney should be fully conversant with all founda-
tion questions necessary to elicit expert testimony or secure ad-mission of evidence. He should also make ample use of demon-
strative evidence and encourage his expert to prepare charts, dia-grams, and other types of demonstrative evidence to emphasizehis testimony. Attorney and expert alike should search for trea-
tises, periodicals, and studies by other experts that support theexpert's opinions. All of these materials can be mentioned to thejury, whether or not they are admissible as evidence.5'
50. Before the expert witness even appears in court, counsel should once again reviewthe contents of his file. Any problems associated with his file should be handled outsidethe presence of the jury before the expert testifies. Opposing counsel can substantiallylessen the credibility of a proponent and his expert by forcing an objection to a requested
examination of the expert's file.
51. WASH. R. EVID. 703.
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The obvious weak points in the testimony of one's own expert
should be brought out on direct examination rather than waiting
for cross-examination. Using one's own terminology, emphasis
and tone can substantially minimize those problems inherent in
the expert's testimony.Some expert witnesses are so persuasive that the attorney
need ask only one or two broad questions and then let the witness
lecture the jury on the work he performed on the case.5" Where
an expert witness is not quite so capable, the attorney can still
make use of the hypothetical question or a summarizing state-
ment to set forth the various facts upon which the expert relies."
In this manner, an attorney can virtually sum up, at least in a
factual sense, in the middle of his case.
VI. EXAMINING THE OPPOSING EXPERT AT TRIAL
A. Preliminary Matters
It is important to bring a motion in limine with respect to any
inadmissible areas that will be covered during the direct exami-
nation by opposing counsel. By the time of trial, one should have
considerable knowledge about problem areas. A common problem
involves the expert who has been retained in prior litigations by
the cross-examining attorney or a member of his office. The cross-
examining attorney should seek to preclude reference to that fact.
Whether a court will grant such a motion, however, is unclear.'4
Counsel may interrupt the direct examination and request
permission to ask questions where the direct examination has not
established the competency of the witness to express an opinion
52. A witness should not be permitted, however, to simply read from reports or notes
that he has prepared. That type of delivery is certain to lose the jury's attention.
53. Rule 705 does not probibit use of the hypothetical question. It merely removes
the requirement that previously encouraged its use.
54. A longstanding relationship between the expert and the cross-examining attorney
conceivably could influence the expert's testimony. It seems unfair, however, that an
attorney's professional relationship should prejudice his client. Where the proponent him-
self hires the expert, the inquiry should be prohibited unless actual bias can be clearly
demonstrated. In most cases, the proponent's goal is wholly unrelated to potential bias.
One would expect that the proponent has called the expert as a witness because his
opinions are favorable to the direct examiner's client. In fact, the direct examiner's goal
in proving an expert-opposing counsel relationship is to establish the expert's trustworthi-
ness. If it is divulged that the cross-examiner himself previously retained the expert, he
will have substantial difficulty in attacking the expert's qualifications. To a lesser extent,
his ability to attack the expert's substantive opinions will also be impaired. The cross-
examiner's client should not be saddled with these limitations as a result of his attorney's
relationship with the opposing expert.
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or conclusion15 The court will ordinarily grant such a request.
B. Cross-Examination
The strategies involved in taking depositions and conductingcross-examination at trial are markedly different. The depositionis the attorney's opportunity to probe with impunity. Probingduring trial examination can be, and often is, catastrophic. Evenworse than the substantive damage suffered is the resulting lossof professional regard felt by the trier of fact.The cross-examination should be brief and conceptually sim-ple. Questions that allow an expert to restate either his qualifica-tions or opinions should be avoided. Unlike the deposition exami-nation, only leading questions should be asked during cross-examination. Questions should repeatedly use characterizationsand concepts that are favorable to one's own theory of the case.If possible, the opposing expert should be limited to giving "yes"and "no" answers. Only questions to which an attorney is vir-tually certain of the answer should be asked. A direct attack onthe personal integrity of an expert witness should not be launchedunless serious damage can be inflicted. Jurors do not respond wellto such personal attacks. 56"Learned treatises" contradictory to the opposing expert'sopinion should be read, at length, to the witness."7 Once it isestablished that the treatise is a reliable authority, Rule 803(18)provides that it shall be admitted as substantive evidence and notmerely as a basis for impeachment. Although it will not be re-ceived as an exhibit,5" direct reference can be made to the treatiseduring summation.
If the opposing expert relies entirely upon hypothetical facts,a whole series of questions might be asked in which the witnessmust admit that he has never met with or talked to any of theactual lay witnesses in the litigation. Many lawyers also routinely
55. Until the adoption of Rule 705, this request could also be made when a properfoundation for an opinion had not been laid. WASH. R. EVID. 705.
56. An attorney is far better advised to have the expert witness admit that he hastestified in many different areas and that there are specific subspecialties of a disciplinethat better relate to the problem at issue.
57. Rule 803(18) liberally allows the use of such "published treatises, periodicals orpamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art" as long as such adocument is a "reliable authority by the testimony of the opposing expert or any otherexpert." WAsH. R. EvID. 803(18). Again, it is necessary to make certain that the volumeis the most current edition of that treatise.
58. WASH. R. EVID. 803(18).
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ask opposing experts if they have ever been wrong with respect
to other opinions they have rendered. In asking this question, an
attorney does not care which answer the opposing expert gives. If
possible, the most telling line of the attack should be saved for
the end of the examination. That high point is what jurors and
judges will remember.
VII. CONCLUSION
Modern civil litigation has emphasized the importance of
expert witnesses. In fact, there are few civil cases whose outcomes
are not significantly shaped by expert testimony. An attorney
who has not developed a systematic approach to the management
of such experts enters the litigation process at a decided disad-
vantage.
